Various extensions of public announcement logic have been proposed with quantification over announcements. The best-known extension is called arbitrary public announcement logic, APAL. It contains a primitive language construct ✷ϕ intuitively expressing that "after every public announcement of a formula, formula ϕ is true." The logic APAL is undecidable and it has an infinitary axiomatization. Now consider restricting the APAL quantification to public announcements of boolean formulas only, such that ✷ϕ intuitively expresses that "after every public announcement of a boolean formula, formula ϕ is true." This logic can therefore called boolean arbitrary public announcement logic, BAPAL. The logic BAPAL is the subject of this work. It is decidable and it has a finitary axiomatization. These results may be considered of interest, as for various applications quantification over booleans is sufficient in formal specifications.
Introduction
Public announcement logic (PAL) [15, 19] extends epistemic logic with operators for reasoning about the effects of specific public announcements. The formula [ψ]ϕ means that "ϕ is true after the truthful announcement of ψ." This means that, when interpreted in a Kripke model with designated state, after submodel restriction to the states where ϕ is true (this includes the designated state, 'truthful' here means true), ψ is true in that restriction. Arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL) [4] augments this with operators for quantifying over public announcements. The formula ✷ϕ means that "ϕ is true after the truthful announcement of any formula that does not contain ✷."
Quantifying over the communication of information as in APAL has applications to epistemic protocol synthesis, where we wish to achieve epistemic goals by communicating information to agents, but where we do not know of a specific protocol that will achieve the goal, and where we may not even know if such a protocol exists. In principle, synthesis problems can be solved by specifying them as formulas in the logic, and applying model-checking or satisfiability procedures. However in the case of APAL, while there is a PSPACE-complete model-checking procedure [1] , the satisfiability problem is undecidable in the presence of multiple agents [13] .
The quest for a decidable version of public announcement logic with quantification has been going on for a while. Group announcement logic and coalition announcement logic, that are logics with quantifiers over public information change that are similar to APAL, are also undecidable [2] . Whereas the 'mental model' arbitrary public announcement logic of [10] is decidable. Yet other dynamic epistemic logics have more generalized quantification, namely over non-public information change. Of those, arbitrary arrow update logic [25] is undecidable, whereas refinement modal logic [8] and arbitrary action model logic [16] are decidable. The above-mentioned [10] , wherein a decidable arbitrary public announcement logic is presented, is an interesting case. Decidability is achieved by restricting epistemic modalities, while retaining arbitrary announcements (of formulas containing such modalities). These special modalities are not labelled with an (abstract set of) agents, but with programs using propositional variables. This severely constrains the relational ('Kripke') models (possibly) satisfying the formulas bound by the epistemic modalities, which is how decidability can then be obtained for this logic. Instead, in the logic that we will propose, we do not restrict the epistemic modalities, but restrict the quantification over the announcements, the dynamic modalities.
We propose a multi-agent epistemic logic with public announcements and with quantification over public announcements of boolean formulas (so-called boolean announcements). 1 We call this boolean arbitrary public announcement logic (BAPAL). It is therefore a version of APAL: as said, in APAL we allow quantification over any quantifier-free (✷-free) formulas, including formulas with announcement modalities and knowledge modalities.
Unlike APAL, BAPAL is decidable.
For APAL only an infinitary axiomatization is known [5] , although it has not been proved that a finitary axiomatization cannot exist [17] . 2 
This
Unlike APAL, BAPAL has a (complete) finitary axiomatization.
We also show that BAPAL is more expressive than public announcement logic. There seem to be many applications, in particular in planning, wherein it makes sense only to consider quantifications over booleans.
Consider cards cryptography wherein two communicating agents (the principals) attempt to learn the card deal without other players (eavesdroppers) learning the card deal, or even something stronger, such as not learning the ownership of any single card other than their own [12, 20, 11] . When modelling initial uncertainty about a stack of cards being dealt over a finite set of players, single states in such models can be uniquely identified with a card deal. Therefore, public announcements restricting such models correspond to booleans. For example, let there be three cards 0, 1, 2 and three players Alice, Bob, and Eve, and suppose that Alice announces (truthfully) that she holds card 0. This corresponds to the public announcement of (some elementary boolean representation of) two card deals, namely the one wherein, additionally, Bob holds 1 and Eve holds 2, and the one wherein Bob holds 2 and Eve holds 1.
As another example, consider multi-agent planning for publicly observable sensing actions under uncertainty [18, 22, 7, 9] : given multiple agents that are uncertain about a number of system parameters (lights, switches, temperature settings) they may be informed, or they may be informing each other, about their observations of the state of the light. Or they may be planning to make such observations, and contingent on the outcome of such observations take further action.
We close the introduction with an outline of the content of this work. In Section 2 we define the logical language and semantics of BAPAL and we give various semantic results that will be used in later sections. Section 3 is on the expressivity of BAPAL, and Section 4 presents the complete axiomatization. Finally, Section 5 proves the decidability of BAPAL.
Boolean arbitrary public announcement logic
Given are a countable (finite or countably infinite) set of agents A and a countably infinite set of propositional variables P (a.k.a. atoms, or variables).
Syntax
We start with defining the logical language and some crucial syntactic notions.
Definition 1 (Language) The language of boolean arbitrary public announcement logic is defined as follows, where a ∈ A and p ∈ P .
Other propositional connectives are defined by abbreviation. For K a ϕ read 'agent a knows ϕ'. For ✷ϕ, read 'after any (boolean) announcement, ϕ (is true)'. For [ϕ]ψ, read 'after public announcement of ϕ, ψ'. The dual modalities are defined by abbreviation:K a ϕ := ¬K a ¬ϕ, ϕ ψ := ¬[ϕ]¬ψ, and ✸ϕ := ¬✷¬ϕ. Unless confusion results we often omit one or both of the parameters A and P in L bapal (A, P ), and write L bapal (P ) or L bapal . Formula variables ϕ, ψ are possibly primed to denote other formula variables:
We also distinguish the language L el of epistemic logic (without the constructs [ϕ]ϕ and ✷ϕ) and the language L pl of propositional logic (without additionally the construct K a ϕ), also known as the booleans. Formula variables for booleans are ϕ 0 , ψ 0 , etc.
The set of propositional variables that occur in a given formula ϕ is denoted var(ϕ), its modal depth d(ϕ) is the maximum nesting of K a modalities, and its quantifier depth D(ϕ) is the maximum nesting of ✷ modalities. These all have obvious inductive definitions.
3 If p / ∈ var(ϕ) we say that p is a fresh atom. Arbitrary announcement normal form is a syntactic restriction of L bapal that pairs all public announcements with arbitrary boolean announcement operators. It plays a role in the decidability proof. We will show that any formula in L bapal is equivalent to one in L aanf .
Definition 2 (Arbitrary announcement normal form)
The language fragment L aanf is defined by the following syntax, where a ∈ A and p ∈ P .
We now define necessity forms and possibility forms. Necessity forms are used in derivation rules in the proof system. Definition 3 (Necessity form) Consider a new symbol ♯. The necessity forms are defined inductively as follows, where ϕ ∈ L bapal and a ∈ A.
A necessity form contains a unique occurrence of the symbol ♯. If ψ(♯) is a necessity form and ϕ ∈ L bapal , then ψ(ϕ) is ψ(♯)[ϕ/♯] (the substitution of ♯ in ψ(♯) by ϕ), where we note that ψ(ϕ) ∈ L bapal . A possibility form is the dual of a necessity form. They are therefore defined as:
Similarly to above, notation ψ{ϕ} means that ♯ is substituted by ϕ in ψ{♯}. Given possibility form ψ(♯), let ψ{♯} be obtained by replacing all → in ψ(♯) by ∧, all K a byK a , and all [ϕ] by ϕ . Note that ψ{♯} is indeed a possibility form. We will later show that every ¬ψ(¬ϕ) is equivalent to ψ{ϕ}.
Structures
We consider the following structures and structural notions in this work.
consists of a domain S of states (or 'worlds'), an accessibility function ∼: A → P(S × S), where each ∼ a is an equivalence relation, and a valuation V : P → P(S), where each V (p) represents the set of states where p is true. For s ∈ S, a pair (M, s), for which we write M s , is an epistemic state. ⊣
We will abuse the language and also call M s a model.
′ is a bisimulation if and only if for every (s, s ′ ) ∈ R, p ∈ P , and a ∈ A the conditions atoms, forth and back hold.
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• atoms:
• forth: for every t ∼ a s there exists
• back:
If there exists a bisimulation R between M and
′ satisfying atoms for all p ∈ Q, and forth and back, is a Q-bisimulation (a bisimulation restricted to Q). The notation for Q-restricted bisimilarity is ↔ Q . ⊣ Definition 6 (n-Bisimulation) Let n ∈ N. We define the notion of n-bisimulation R between (pointed) epistemic models
Then, R is a (n + 1)-bisimulation between M s and M ′ s ′ , iff for all p ∈ P and a ∈ A:
• n-forth: For every t ∼ a s there exists
Similary to Q-bisimulations we define Q-n-bisimulations, wherein atoms is only required for p ∈ Q ⊆ P . ⊣
Semantics
We continue with the semantics of our logic.
Definition 7 (Semantics)
The interpretation of formulas in L on epistemic models is defined by induction on formulas. Assume an epistemic model M = (S, ∼, V ), and s ∈ S.
Just as for the logical language, we may occasionally write M(P ), M s (P ), BAPAL(P ), in order to be explicit about the parameter set of atoms P .
Note that the languages of APAL and BAPAL are the same, but that their semantics are different. The only difference is the interpretation of ✷ϕ: in APAL, this quantifies over the ✷-free fragment [4] , so that, given the eliminability of public announcements from that fragment [19] , this amounts to quantifying over formulas of epistemic logic:.
(APAL semantics of ✷ϕ)
Semantic results
We continue with basic semantic results for the logic. They will be used in various of the later sections. Various well-known results for any dynamic epistemic logic with propositional quantification generalize straightforwardly to BAPAL. We start with the bisimulation invariance of BAPAL. This is shown as for APAL.
Proof We prove that: for all ϕ ∈ L bapal , and for all
from which the required follows by restricting the scope of ϕ to the consequent of the implication. The proof is by induction on the structure of ϕ, where the ✷-depth D(ϕ) takes lexicographic precedence over formula structure. 5 The non-standard inductive cases are [ϕ]ψ and ✷ψ (in either case we only show one direction of the equivalence in the conclusion; the other direction is similar).
This case is well-known from public announcement logic.
The latter is by definition equal to:
Firstly, from M s ↔ N s ′ and M s |= ϕ, it follows by induction that N s ′ |= ϕ. Secondly, this not only holds for s but for any t in the domain of M and t ′ in the domain of N: from M t ↔ N t ′ and M t |= ϕ, it follows by induction that N t ′ |= ϕ. We emphasize that, given that ϕ is a subformula of [ϕ]ψ, the induction hypothesis applies to any bisimilar model pair, not merely to M s and N s ′ .
This allows us to show that
. We now show that the relation R ′ is a bisimulation. The clause atoms is obvious. For forth, let s Winding up, we now have shown that
(Note that the induction applies not merely to s but to any state t in N satisfying ϕ 0 , needed to establish
The next lemma may look obvious but is actually rather special: it holds for BAPAL but not, for example, for APAL, where the quantifiers are over formulas of arbitrarily large modal depth. Lemma 10 plays a role in Section 3 on expressivity.
Lemma 10 Let two models
Proof We show the above by proving the following statement:
We prove this by refining the complexity measure used in the previous proposition: we now, additionally, give modal depth d(ϕ) lexicographic precedence over quantifier depth D(ϕ). 6 For clarity we give the -essentially different-case K a ϕ and also the -essentially the same-cases [ϕ]ψ and ✷ψ. The latter two apply for any n ∈ N and do not require the induction over n. We let these cases therefore precede the case K a ϕ.
In this case of the proof we need to use induction on subformulas of 
. This is therefore similar again to the same case in the previous Lemma
It is now crucial to note that, as ϕ 0 is boolean, not only D(ϕ) = 0 but also d(ϕ 0 ) = 0. We therefore obtain by induction, as in the previous case
we can apply the induction hypothesis for n and conclude that M ′ t ′ |= ϕ. As t ′ was arbitrary, M t |= K a ϕ.
The interest of the above proof is the precedence of modal depth over quantifier depth, and of quantifier depth over subformula complexity. Essential in the proof is that in the case ✷ψ, for any [ϕ 0 ]ψ witnessing that, not only D(ϕ 0 ) = 0 but also d(ϕ 0 ) = 0. Without d(ϕ 0 ) = 0 the inductive hypothesis would not have applied. In contrast, the APAL quantifier is over formulas of arbitrary finite modal depth, also exceeding the modal depth of the initial given formula, which rules out use of induction. As a matter of side interest we wish to observe that for both APAL and BAPAL restricted bisimilarity does not preserve restricted modal equivalence, i.e., we do not have
The failure of this property is indirectly used in Proposition 19 in the expressivity section, later, for Q = {p} (and for models with those names).
Lemma 11 Every formula of L bapal is semantically equivalent to a formula in arbitrary announcement normal form. ⊣ Proof We give the proof by defining a truth preserving transformation δ from L bapal to L aanf . This is defined with the following recursion:
All these equivalences are semantically valid. The equivalences
ψ are wellknown from works on public announcement logic [19, 24] . We further note that according to the usual measures in public announcement logic [24, 5] in all but one translation clause the complexity of the right-hand side of each equivalence is either equal to or lower than the complexity of the left-hand side of the equivalence. In particular
The exception is that, of course, δ(✷ψ) is less, not more, complex than [⊤]✷δ(ψ). But this does not adversely affect termination. Therefore, δ will always return a formula in L aanf .
Lemma 12 Given are necessity form ψ(♯), possibility form ψ{♯}, and ϕ ∈ L bapal . Then ¬ψ(ϕ) is equivalent to ψ{¬ϕ}. ⊣ Proof This is easily shown by induction on the structure of necessity forms and using that
A number of obvious BAPAL validities is as follows.
Proposition 13
• |= ✷ϕ → ✷✷ϕ (4)
• |= ✷✸ϕ → ✸✷ϕ (MK)
• |= ✸✷ϕ → ✷✸ϕ (CR) ⊣
Proof
• The dual validity ✸✸ϕ → ✸ϕ follows from the simple observation that for all ϕ 0 , ψ 0 ∈ L pl and for all M:
So, this is a more direct proof than in [4] , where it is used that M ϕψ is bisimilar to
ϕψ is typically not bisimilar to M ϕ∧ψ .
• MK is shown in the usual way. Assume that M s |= ✷✸ϕ. Given the set var (ϕ) of propositional variables occurring in ϕ, let δ s (ϕ) be the characteristic function for the valuation of var (ϕ)
• In order to prove CR we have to show that: for all ϕ 0 , ψ 0 ∈ L pl and for all M, there are ϕ
We will now define the novel notion of boolean closure, and prove some lemmas for it. These will play a role in proving the soundness of the axiomatization of the logic BAPAL, later.
Definition 14 (Boolean closure) Given atoms P , considerP = P ∪{p ϕ 0 | ϕ 0 ∈ L pl (P )}. The boolean closure of a model M = (S, ∼, V ) for atoms P is the modelM = (S, ∼,V ) that is as M, except that the boolean closed valuationV is for atomsP and such thaẗ
As P is countably infinite, and as the booleans on P can be enumerated,P is also countably infinite. Given an epistemic model, then for each atom and for each boolean there are also infinitely many atoms with the same value on the boolean closure of that model. E.g., p has the same value as p p∧p (i.e., the atom q corresponding to the boolean p ∧ p), and the same value as p p∧p∧p (the atom q ′ corresponding to boolean p ∧ p ∧ p), etc. On a boolean closed modelM, for all booleans, including booleans of atoms inP \ P , there is an atom with the same value, so that the semantics of ✷ becomes:
The next lemma involves a translation tr : L bapal (P ) → L bapal (P ) defined as tr(p ϕ 0 ) = ϕ 0 for p ϕ 0 ∈P \ P and all other clauses trivial.
8 Similar results for APAL were obtained in, e.g., [23] . What is crucial here is that on such models a formula is satisfiable iff it is valid; the K a and ✷ modalities then collapse: if ϕ is true, then it is known, and remains so after update. The implicit quantification of ✷ over atoms not in the restriction has no distinguishing power now.
9 So, the proof of CR for BAPAL is easier than for other quantified epistemic logics, where we 'close the diamond at the bottom': we then declare the values of all atoms, i.e., ϕ
Lemma 15 Let ψ ∈ L bapal (P ), model M = (S, ∼, V ) for atoms P and s ∈ S be given.
The proof is by induction on ψ. As in other proofs in our contribution, it is important for the induction that the formula is declared before the model and the state in which it is interpreted. The interesting cases are:
. In step (*) we use that by induction,M s |= ϕ 0 iff M s |= ϕ 0 , where tr(ϕ 0 ) = ϕ 0 ; that this also holds for all other t satisfying ϕ 0 in M, from which follows
we then use induction for ψ ′ on another model than M, where we note that that the boolean closure of a model restriction is that restriction of the boolean closure of the model, so thatM
The following result will be needed to show the soundness of a rule in the axiomatization of BAPAL. As a similar result from the literature ([4, Prop. 3.7]) was later shown false, we give the proof in full detail. An atom q is fresh in a formula ϕ containing it, if ϕ does not contain another occurrence of q.
Lemma 17 Let ψ{♯} be a possibility form, and M = (S, ∼, V ) an epistemic model. If M s |= ψ{✸ϕ} thenM s |= ψ{ p ϕ} for a fresh p ∈P . ⊣ Proof The proof is by induction on the structure of possibility forms. It is slightly more elegant to prove the Lemma as an equivalence than as an implication. The other direction of the equivalence is the direct application of the semantics of ✷. Further note that in the formulation of the Lemma the formula is declared prior to the model. Therefore, induction hypotheses for a subformula apply to model restrictions.
Note that it could have been that ϕ 0 = p ∈ P , but even so the variable p p is then different from variable p with the same value.
′ { p ϕ} Again, as p is fresh in ψ ′ { p ϕ} and p ∈P \ P , p remains fresh in ψ ψ ′ { p ϕ}. Also note that the induction for ψ ′ {♯} (for ψ ′ {✸ϕ}) applies to any model, so also to M ψ s .
Lemma 18
Let ϕ ∈ L bapal (P ) and p ∈ var (ϕ), and let M s be an epistemic model. If ϕ is valid, thenM s |= ϕ[q/p] for any q ∈P \ P . ⊣ Proof Let ϕ be a validity in BAPAL(P ). We first show that, if P ⊆ Q, then ϕ is a validity in BAPAL(Q). It is more intuitive to show the contrapositive (where we replace ϕ by ¬ϕ): if ϕ is satisfiable for BAPAL(Q), then ϕ is satisfiable for BAPAL(P ). In the context of this proof (and only in the context of this proof), we do not only have to keep track explicitly of the parameter set of propositional variables for which the logical language is defined, but similarly of the set of propositional variables for which a model is defined. We therefore resort to let M s (Q) denote that model M is defined for variables Q. This also implies that, given some M s (P ), its boolean closure isM s (P ). We now first prove by induction on ϕ ∈ L bapal (P ) that for all
s (P ) |= ϕ ′ (as usual, note that the inductive hypothesis applies to any model N t (Q), not merely to M s (Q); it therefore applies to
For any atom q ∈ var (ψ 0 ) such that q ∈ Q \ P , choose a fresh atom p ′ ∈ P (fresh with respect to ψ 0 and ϕ ′ , and with respect to prior choices of such atoms in var(ψ 0 )), and transform M into N = (S, ∼, V ′ ) with
as the value of ϕ ′ does not depend on swapping variables not occurring in it.
By induction, and as ψ
follows N s (P ) |= ✸ϕ ′ . Now observe that N s (P ) and M s (P ) only differ in variables not occurring in ✸ϕ ′ , so that N s (P ) |= ✸ϕ ′ iff M s (P ) |= ✸ϕ ′ . Therefore, M s (P ) |= ✸ϕ ′ . We can now quickly close the argument. Let ϕ be satisfiable for Q. Then there is M s (Q) such that M s (Q) |= ϕ. Using the above, M s (P ) |= ϕ. Therefore ϕ is satisfiable for P .
This proves that, if ϕ is valid for P , and P ⊆ Q, then ϕ is valid for Q. We continue. Clearly P ⊂P . So, if ϕ is a validity of BAPAL(P ), then ϕ is a validity of BAPAL(P ). We now use that, for any validity ϕ ′′ in a logic BAPAL(P ′′ ), p ′′ ∈ P ′′ , and fresh q ′′ ∈ P ′′ , ϕ[q ′′ /p ′′ ] is also a BAPAL(P ′′ ) validity. Therefore, given that ϕ is a validity of BAPAL(P ) and a (obviously) fresh q ∈P \ P , also ϕ[q/p] is a validity of BAPAL(P ). Here is it important to observe that this is a validity for the epistemic model class for variablesP , it is not relative to boolean closed models. In other words, the value of q, if q = p ϕ 0 , need not be related to the boolean ϕ 0 . But, fortunately, a boolean closed model for P is, after all, a model forP . Therefore, alsoM s (P ) |= ϕ[q/p], as required.
Expressivity
Given two logics X and Y , with languages respectively L X and L Y :
• X is at least as expressive as Y iff for all ϕ ∈ L Y there is a semantically equivalent ψ ∈ L X ;
• X and Y are equally expressive iff X is at least as expressive as Y , and Y is at least as expressive as X;
• X is (strictly) more expressive than Y iff X is at least as expressive as Y and Y is not at least as expressive as X.
We show that BAPAL is more expressive than EL and that BAPAL is not as least as expressive as two other logics with quantification over announcements: APAL, and group announcement logic (GAL) [1] . It is not known if APAL and GAL are at least as expressive as BAPAL.
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In the models depicted below we use the following visual conventions: the names of states are replaced by the sets of atoms true in those states; the accessibility relations for the two agents a, b are reflexively and symmetrically (and transitively) closed, in other words, they partition the domain into equivalence classes; and the actual state (the designated world) is underlined.
Proposition 19 BAPAL is more expressive than EL. ⊣
Proof To prove that BAPAL is more expressive than EL we first observe that L el ⊆ L bapal , so that BAPAL is at least as expressive as EL, and we then observe that the (standard) proof that EL is not at least as expressive as APAL [4] can also be used to show that EL is not at least as expressive as BAPAL.
We recall the proof in [4] , wherein the formula ✸(K a p ∧ ¬K b K a p) is shown not to be equivalent to an epistemic logical formula ψ as follows. There must be a propositional variable q not occurring in ψ. Two models that are bisimilar except for q will either make ψ true in both or false in both. On the other hand, ✸(K a p ∧ ¬K b K a p) may be true in one and false in the other, as it quantifies over variable q as well. This quantification is implicit, as q ∈ var (✸(K a p ∧ ¬K b K a p). We can therefore easily make q (K a p ∧ ¬K b K a p) true in one and false in the other, as shown below for M s and M ′ s ′ . As the announcement q witnessing the diamond is a boolean, this also proves the case for BAPAL.
{p} {} {p, q} {q}
Proposition 20 BAPAL is not at least as expressive as APAL. ⊣ Proof Consider (again, but to other usage) L apal formula ✸(K a p ∧ ¬K b K a p). Let us suppose that there exists an equivalent L bapal formula ψ. Given the modal depth d(ψ) of ψ, consider two models N t , O t ′ , with a difference between them further away from the root
Formally, N t and O t ′ can be defined as follows. Model N t has domain Z, equivalence classes for relation ∼ a consisting of pairs {2i, 2i+1} for i ∈ Z and for relation ∼ b consisting of pairs {2i − 1, 2i} for i ∈ Z, and with V (p) = i∈Z {4i − 1, 4i}. The actual state t is state 0. Note that M s ↔ N t , where M s is the model that was used in the previous proposition. Model O t ′ is as model N t (and with t ′ = 0), except that the domain is restricted to the range i ≤ 4j, where j is the least positive integer for which d(ψ) < 4j (so, on the left model O is infinite, on the right it ends in two p worlds). As the argument in the proof is abstract (ψ is hypothetical) and only needs j to be in excess of
(we only need to refer to formulas of modal depth larger than d(ψ)), the schematic visualization of these models below, wherein we have abstracted from the names of states, suffices in the proof.
We use Lemma 10 that n-bisimilarity implies n-logical equivalence: from
To prove the latter we observe that any finite subset of the model O can be distinguished from its complement by a formula in the logic (by 'distinguished' we mean that the formula is true in all the states of that subset and false in all other states of the domain of that model), where we use that any state can be distinguished from all others by its distance to the rightmost terminal state, that is distinguished by K a p. 11 In particular, there must therefore be a distinguishing formula ϕ of a three-state subset of O such that O ϕ is as depicted. As
. This is a contradiction with (i). Therefore, no such ψ ∈ L bapal exists.
As a corollary of Proposition 20 we can very similarly show that BAPAL is not at least as expressive as GAL, as in GAL we also quantify over announcements of arbitrarily large modal depth.
Axiomatization
We now provide a sound and complete finitary axiomatisation for boolean arbitrary announcement logic.
Definition 21 (Axiomatization bapal bapal bapal) This is the axiomatization bapal bapal bapal of BAPAL.
The rules and axioms in bapal bapal bapal are as in the axiomatization of APAL, except for the axiom A✷ and the derivation rule R✷. A formula ϕ is a theorem (notation ⊢ ϕ) if it belongs to the least set of formulas containing all axioms and closed under the derivation rules.
The main interest of bapal bapal bapal is that it is finitary, unlike other known axiomatizations for logics with quantification over announcements [4, 1, 14] (except for [6] , see Footnote 2). Essential towards proving that result is Lemma 17, stating that every diamond ✸ in a possibility form is witnessed by the announcement p of a fresh variable. 11 The rightmost state in O is distinguished by K a p. The state to its left (in the picture) is distinguished byK b K a p ∧ ¬K a p, and the state to the left of that byK aKb K a p ∧ ¬(K b K a p ∧ ¬K a p) ∧ ¬K a p. And so on. To distinguish any finite subset in O from its complement, take the disjunction of the distinguishing formulas of its members.
12 A similar lemma and finitary axiomatization reported for APAL [4] are in fact incorrect, see http://personal.us.es/hvd/errors.html, although for APAL the infinitary axiomatization stands [4, 3, 5] .
To demonstrate soundness and completeness of the axiomatization bapal bapal bapal we can (still) use the line of reasoning in [4] .
We start with soundness. The soundness of axiom A✷ directly follows from the semantics of ✷. To establish the soundness of rule R✷, consider three versions of this derivation rule (let ψ(♯) be a necessity form).
• R✷ ω : (ψ([ϕ 0 ]ϕ) for all ϕ 0 ∈ L pl ) implies ψ(✷ϕ).
• R✷ 1 : (ψ([p]ϕ) for a fresh p ∈ P ) implies ψ(✷ϕ).
•
We can analogously consider three axiomatizations:
We show that all three of R✷ ω , R✷ 1 , and R✷ are sound, and that all three axiomatizations are sound and complete. It is thus a matter of taste which one is preferred. Note that bapal bapal bapal ω is infinitary whereas bapal bapal bapal 1 and bapal bapal bapal are finitary. Finitary axiomatizations are considered preferable over infinitary axiomatizations. Both bapal bapal bapal 1 and bapal bapal bapal have (an instantiation of) a necessity form as premiss. The difference is that
ϕ is a particular necessity form whereas ψ([p]ϕ) can be any necessity form. As R✷ is more restrictive in logical structure, it may be considered preferable. Again, this is a matter of taste.
The soundness of rule R✷ ω directly follows from the semantics of ✷. We now show that the derivation rule R✷ 1 is sound. This is the main technical result of this section, wherein we use results for the boolean completion of models, introduced in Section 2.
Proposition 22 Derivation rule R✷
1 is sound. ⊣ Proof We recall that for any ψ(ϕ ′ ) ∈ L bapal (where ψ(♯) is a necessity form), ψ{¬ϕ ′ } (where ψ ′ {♯} is a possibility form) is equivalent to ¬ψ(ϕ ′ ) (Lemma 12). Suppose that ψ([p]ϕ) ∈ L bapal (P ) is valid where p is fresh. Let M be any epistemic model. Then from Lemma 18 follows thatM s |= ψ([q]ϕ) for any fresh atom q ∈P \ P . Therefore it is not the case that: there is a q ∈P \ P such thatM s |= ψ{ q ¬ϕ} where q is fresh. By applying the contrapositive of Lemma 17, we obtain M s |= ψ{✸¬ϕ}, i.e., M s |= ψ(✷ϕ). Proof The soundness of the infinitary axiomatization bapal bapal bapal ω follows from the soundness of the infinitary derivation rule R✷ ω mentioned above. The completeness of bapal bapal bapal ω is shown exactly as in [5] (where we note that the proof in [5] is an improvement on the version found in [4] ): we only have to replace 'epistemic' by 'boolean' on some occasions. It is therefore omitted. 13 The completeness part involves a canonical model construction and a fairly involved complexity measure and truth lemma with induction and subinduction using that complexity.
Lemma 26 ([4])
A derivation in bapal bapal bapal 1 can be transformed into a derivation in bapal bapal bapal.⊣ Proof This proof is also found in [4] , but we present it slightly differently. A rule application of R✷ 1 in a derivation can be transformed into a rule application of R✷ plus additional derivation steps. These additional steps simulate the semantical equivalences used below.
Let a necessity form ϕ ′′ (♯) be given. Note that ♯ is always the final (rightmost) nonauxiliary symbol in a necessity form (only parentheses ')' may follow it). Consider a formula ϕ ′′ ([p]ϕ). We can transform/rewrite it into a formula of the required shape
ϕ by using some (provable) equivalences of public announcement logic (see also the proof of Lemma 11). All these equivalences preserve the property that the formula is an instantiation of a necessity form. To avoid separate treatment of boundary cases, note that
, and take the latter as the starting point of the rewrite procedure. The equivalences are the following. Their possibly iterated application 13 What exactly is 'exactly' ? As we omit the proof for that reason, we should maybe justify this in detail. There are differences. The names of the axioms and rules in [5] are different from ours. For example, the axiom K a (ϕ → ψ) → (K a ϕ → K a ψ) that we call K, they call A1, etc. This is not a relevant difference. Instead of the axiom A✷ and the rule R✷ ω involving booleans, the system in [5] has an axiom and rule involving epistemic formulas (but that are otherwise identical): an axiom "✷ϕ → [ψ]ϕ where ψ ∈ L el " and a rule "(ψ([ϕ ′ ]ϕ for all ϕ ′ ∈ L el ) implies ψ(✷ϕ)". Whether this is a relevant difference depends on their usage in the proof. Careful examination of the entire proof reveals about a dozen occurrences of the word 'epistemic' that have to be replaced by the word 'boolean' while the same argument still holds: their role is in all occasions that these formulas do not contain ✷ operators and thus have lower complexity, which is required for inductive assumptions. This is a relevant difference. But it can be handled by replacing 'epistemic' by 'boolean'. (And that is all. This is surprisingly easy to handle.) We forget one final difference: the system in in [5] contains an additional derivation rule "ϕ implies ✷ϕ", that we do not have. But it is derivable in [5] : let ϕ be given, then for all ψ we get, with NecA, [ψ]ϕ, so in particular we get that for all epistemic ψ, from which with their version of R✷ ω follows ✷ϕ, as required. So this is also not a relevant difference.
delivers the required form.
With these results we can now easily demonstrate that not only bapal bapal bapal ω but also the other two axiomatizations are complete and define the same set of theorems. Below, let the name of the axiomatization stand for the set of derivable theorems.
• bapal bapal bapal ω ⊆ bapal bapal bapal 1 : A derivation with R✷ ω rule applications (with, for each such application, an infinite number of premisses, one for each boolean) can be transformed into one with R✷ 1 rule applications by removing all but one premiss (namely, keep one for a fresh boolean p) in each such R✷ ω rule application.
• bapal bapal bapal 1 = bapal bapal bapal: A derivation with R✷ 1 rule applications can be transformed into one with R✷ rule applications by employing the (derivable) equivalences in the transformation spelled out above (Lemma 11). The other direction (of the mutual inclusion) is trivial, as a R✷ rule application is also a R✷ 1 rule application.
• bapal bapal bapal ⊆ bapal bapal bapal ω : Here we use completeness of bapal bapal bapal ω . Let a bapal bapal bapal theorem be given. Using soundness of bapal bapal bapal, we obtain that it is valid. The completeness proof of bapal bapal bapal ω involves showing that every bapal bapal bapal ω consistent formula is satisfiable. In other words, all BAPAL validities are bapal bapal bapal ω theorems. So, our bapal bapal bapal theorem, that is a BAPAL validity, is a bapal bapal bapal ω theorem.
Theorem 27 bapal bapal bapal is complete. ⊣
Decidability of the satisfiability problem
To show that BAPAL is decidable we give a procedure to find a finite model of any satisfiable formula. The correctness of this procedure is shown by induction over the depth of the nesting of the ✷ operator. Given a formula ϕ ∈ L bapal , we recall that D(ϕ) is the maximum nesting of ✷ operators in ϕ, that d(ϕ) is the maximum nesting of K a operators (for any a ∈ A) in ϕ, and that var(ϕ) is the set of propositional variables that appear in ϕ.
Lemma 11 demonstrated that we may assume without loss of generality that any formula ϕ is in arbitrary announcement normal form (ϕ ∈ L aanf ), and consequently that all ✷ operators are necessarily coupled with a single public announcement operator, and vice versa. This assumption will now be made throughout this section. This means that D(ϕ) now not only determines the number of ✷ modalities in ϕ, but also the (same) number of announcements. Let ψ ⊆ ϕ denote that ψ is a subformula of ϕ in L aanf syntax (so that the subformulas of [ϕ ′ ]✷ϕ exclude ✷ϕ) and let |ϕ| denote the number of symbols in ϕ. In this section, apart from ϕ, ψ we also allow α (possibly primed) to be a formula variable.
To model arbitrary boolean announcements we introduce a set of fresh atoms to represent all the announcements that can be made within a model (by way of associating a set of formulas to a state, such that a subset of the domain will correspond to a set of sets of formulas). These fresh atoms are with respect to a given formula ϕ.
Definition 28 (Closure)
1. Given ϕ ∈ L aanf , we define cl(ϕ), the closure of ϕ, inductively so that:
• cl(ϕ) = {ψ, ¬ψ | ψ ⊆ ϕ} if d(ϕ) = 0, and
Note that in the second clause d(ψ) < d(ϕ), so the definition is well-founded.
2. Let the extended closure of ϕ be cl * (ϕ) := cl(ϕ)∪fresh(ϕ), where fresh(ϕ) = {p k | k ≤ 2 2 (|ϕ|·4 |ϕ| ) } are fresh atoms (we recall that p k is fresh if p k / ∈ var(ϕ)). ⊣
The variables in var(ϕ) ∪ fresh(ϕ) are also denoted as var * (ϕ) (so that var (cl * (ϕ)) = var * (ϕ)). Finally, let for all x ≥ 0 the x-closure set of ϕ be cl x (ϕ) = {ψ ∈ cl(ϕ)| D(ψ) ≤ x}.
As the atoms of fresh(ϕ) are intended to label subsets of subsets of cl(ϕ), i.e, elements of ℘(℘(cl(ϕ))), we first show that |cl(ϕ)| ≤ |ϕ|. 4 |ϕ| , so that we have sufficient labels.
Lemma 29 |cl(ϕ)| ≤ |ϕ|.4 |ϕ| . ⊣
Proof To see this, we consider what the elements of cl(ϕ) look like. They are either a subformula of ϕ or a negation of a subformula of ϕ (from the first clause of Definition 28), or they are a subformula of ϕ prefixed by a series of knowledge operators and negations. Specifically if ϕ has the form
where each j k corresponds to some (not necessarily unique) agent, then the instances of ψ appearing in cl(ϕ) will be • 0 ⋆ 1 • 1 . . . ⋆ k • k ψ where • ℓ is either ¬ or nothing, and ⋆ ℓ is either K j ℓ or nothing. As k < |ϕ|, (there must be at least one atom), and for each ℓ ≤ k there are four possiblilities for the values of • ℓ and ⋆ ℓ , for each subformula, there are less than 4 |ϕ| variations of each subformula of ϕ in the set cl(ϕ). As there are |ϕ| subformulas of ϕ, our upper bound is |ϕ|·4 |ϕ| . , we have ψ ∈ τ ;
if
For the set of x-ϕ-closure models we write Γ x (ϕ), noting that this is consistent with Definition 32. ⊣
Conclusions and further research
We proposed the logic BAPAL. It is an extension of public announcement logic. It contains a modality ✷ϕ intuitively corresponding to: "after every public announcement of a boolean formula, ϕ is true." We have shown that the logic BAPAL is more expressive than multiagent epistemic logic, that it has a finitary axiomatization, and -our main result -that its satisfiability problem is decidable. For further research we reserve the investigation of yet another logic with quantification over announcements, called positive arbitrary public announcement logic, APAL+. It has a primitive modality "after every public announcement of a positive formula, ϕ is true." The positive formulas correspond to the universal fragment in first-order logic. These are the formulas where negations do not bind modalities. We conjecture that this logic is also decidable, like BAPAL. It has been tentatively reported in [21] .
